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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THREE LOST EBOLA FACTS
AND PUBLIC HEALTH LEGAL PREPAREDNESS

ROBERT GATTER*
ABSTRACT
Three key facts about Ebola Transmission should drive policy designed to
control the risk of transmission during a crisis.
• Ebola—like HIV—is not easily transmissible human-to-human.
• Ebola has “dry” and “wet” symptoms, and only the wet symptoms
threaten public health.
• A fever is Ebola’s canary in a coal mine; it provides timely warning of a
coming threat.
Yet, during the U.S. Ebola scare in 2014, these three facts were lost.
Unnecessary quarantine, stigma, and burden on those exposed to Ebola
resulted, including especially for those who volunteered to fight the disease at
its source abroad. Tragically, the law permitted these injustices because
lawyers, judges, and legal rules also lost track of these key Ebola facts. Thus,
public health legal preparedness demands that we do more than clarify relevant
legal standards; we must also prepare lawyers and judges to better account for
key infectious disease facts during the next emergency.

* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis University School of
Law. Thank you to the editors of the Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law and Policy for
their constant professionalism. This Article is dedicated to MC—artist, scientist, survivor, trailblazer, daughter. Thank you especially to Lauren Pair, SLU Law Class of 2019, for her help on this
Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This is a story of a few important facts that got lost during and after the 2014
Ebola scare in America. Without them, hundreds of people were quarantined
unnecessarily, and our best-qualified volunteers became reluctant to fight the
disease at its source where it was growing into an ever-larger global threat.
Central to this story is a failure of law. Legal standards and procedures
existed to account for these important facts, but government officials and courts
did not deploy the law properly.
The law is not prepared for a public health crisis if lawyers, judges, and
officials are not ready to preserve key facts. This Article examines missed
opportunities for the law to get it right, and, in the process, identifies how our
concept of public health legal preparedness needs to be strengthened. But first—
the three essential facts of Ebola transmission that got lost.
II. THREE LOST FACTS ABOUT EBOLA
Fact #1: Ebola—like HIV—is not easily transmissible human-to-human.
An uninfected person must directly contact the bodily fluids of an infected
person. This happens most often when an uninfected person touches the blood,
vomit, or diarrhea of someone who is in the throes of the illness. 1
Nonetheless, several states acted in 2014 as if Ebola was as easily
transmitted as the flu. They quarantined individuals who were exposed to, but
who were not sick with, Ebola. 2 To make matters worse, two federal judges
reviewing the quarantines imposed by officials in two states erroneously
analogized Ebola transmission to the spread of smallpox, yellow fever, and
cholera. 3 Unlike Ebola, smallpox can be transmitted by coughing and sneezing. 4
1. Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.who.int/en/
news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ebola-virus-disease.
2. Quarantine by definition is applied only to individuals who are not sick. What Is the
Difference Between Isolation and Quarantine?, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/answers/publichealth-and-safety/what-is-the-difference-between-isolation-and-quarantine/index.html (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019). Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services states,
“Quarantine is used to separate and restrict the movement of well persons who may have been
exposed to a communicable disease to see if they become ill.” Id. The HHS further explains that
“[t]hese people may have been exposed to a disease and do not know it, or they may have the
disease but do not show symptoms.” Id. Meanwhile, “[i]solation is used to separate ill persons who
have a communicable disease from those who are healthy.” Id. This essay uses each of these terms
in keeping with these descriptions.
3. Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-00201(AVC), 2017 WL 4897048,
at *10–11 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017) (analogizing to a case involving the quarantine of a person
unvaccinated for smallpox who was entering the U.S. from a location where smallpox infections
were prevalent); Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 592 (D.N.J. 2016).
4. How Does Smallpox Spread?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/smallpox/transmission/index.html (last reviewed June 7, 2016).
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Also unlike Ebola, yellow fever is spread by mosquitos, which carry it from an
infected human to an uninfected human as the mosquitos feed. 5 And again,
unlike Ebola, cholera can infect water and food sources and spread to others
when uninfected individuals drink infected water or eat infected food. 6
Healthy people have a much easier time avoiding Ebola than they do
avoiding these other diseases. It is easier to avoid another person’s vomit, blood,
or diarrhea than it is to avoid another person’s cough or sneeze or to avoid
mosquitos, water, or food.
The fact that Ebola is transmitted through direct contact with infected bodily
fluids is well established. Not only is this the mode of transmission reported by
authoritative public health organizations like the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO), 7 but it is also
borne out in descriptions of Ebola outbreaks dating back to 1976. 8 More than
31,000 humans have been infected with Ebola worldwide since 1976. 9 Any
descriptions of the mode of human-to-human transmissions included with case
counts are consistent with there being direct contact with the bodily fluids of
someone very ill with Ebola or who had died recently of the disease. 10
Meanwhile, there are not any accounts of human-to-human transmission of
Ebola as a result of shaking hands with an infected person or being near an
infected person who was coughing or sneezing. 11
5. See Transmission of Yellow Fever Virus, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/yellowfever/transmission/index.html (last updated Aug. 13, 2015).
6. Cholera – Vibrio Cholerae Infection, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/cholera/general/index.html (last reviewed May 11, 2018).
7. Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 1; Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease), CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/transmission/index.html (last reviewed
Mar. 12, 2019).
8. See generally 40 Years of Ebola Virus Disease Around the World, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/chronology.html (describing all
human cases and outbreaks of Ebola reported year by year from 1976 through 2018) (last reviewed
Apr. 3, 2019).
9. See id.
10. History of Ebola Virus Disease, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/summaries.html (noting in many instances that human-tohuman transmission occurred among caretakers of Ebola patients or bodies of the deceased) (last
reviewed Sept. 18, 2018).
11. Robert Gatter, Ebola, Quarantine, and Flawed CDC Policy, 23 U. MIAMI BUS. L. R. 375,
395 (2015). There is a description of one unexplained human-to-human transmission of Ebola in
1976. See J. Burke, et al., Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever in Zaire, 1976, 56 BULL. WORLD HEALTH
ORG. 271, 281 (1978). Investigators confirmed that all instances of Ebola transmission involved
contact between an infected and an uninfected person when the infected person was in the throes
of the illness except for one, about which investigators concluded that “the only possible source of
infection was contact with a probable case 48 hours before the latter developed symptoms.” Id.
This conclusion was reached as scientists and public health workers were still trying to identify and
understand Ebola, including how it spreads. Given that no other case has been identified since that
first outbreak in which a mode of transmission other than direct contact with the bodily fluids of an
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Of course, some scientists—in the name of accuracy—remind us about
“theoretical” risks of Ebola transmission that have yet to be ruled out through
the scientific method, even if those risks have not materialized in the field of
experience. For example, during the 2014 scare, a few Ebola scientists objected
to the absolute statement that Ebola cannot be transmitted by coughing or
sneezing. 12 One responded, “We can never say never,” and another highlighted
that no study exists that affirmatively rules out the possibility of Ebola
transmission by coughing or sneezing. 13
A theoretical risk that cannot be ruled out is not necessarily a risk that we
must account for. Whether we account for a particular risk depends on its
significance, and this is true for theoretical risks that we cannot rule out
definitively. To determine their significance, we must examine them in context.
For example, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan says he cannot rule out the
possibility of running for the presidency in the future, even though he has
announced his retirement from elective politics. 14 Meanwhile, Brett Favre at age
forty-six would not rule out the possibility of coming out of retirement to be the
backup quarterback in the National Football League (NFL) for the Dallas
Cowboys. 15 Because we can readily place these theoretical events in context, it
is not difficult to appreciate that the chance of one of these actually happening
is significant, while the probability of the other one approaches zero.
Here is some context about the theoretical risk of Ebola spreading through
coughs and sneezes. As noted above, the number of reported cases of Ebola
transmission as a result of coughing or sneezing over more than four decades of
field experience and more than 31,000 recorded cases is zero. 16 Reports from
scientists that they cannot definitively rule-out coughing and sneezing as a mode
of Ebola transmission must be understood in light of this overwhelming Ebola

infected person, it is quite possible that this one case conclusion is erroneous. Even if not, however,
it is clearly an aberration as it is only one case that has not been repeated among 31,000 cases and
over four decades of tracking Ebola. A 1 in 31,000 chance translates to a probability of about three
one-thousandths of a percent or—written numerically—about 0.003 percent.
12. David Willman, Some Ebola Experts Worry Virus May Spread More Easily Than
Assumed, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ebola-questions-2014
1007-story.html.
13. Id.
14. Lindsey McPherson, Citing No Regrets About Retiring, Paul Ryan Bets Kevin McCarthy
Will Replace Him, ROLL CALL (July 12, 2018), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/citing-noregrets-retiring-ryan-bets-mccarthy-will-replace (whereby Ryan says, “You never say never to
such things . . .”).
15. See John Breech, Brett Favre’s Willing to Be Cowboys’ Backup QB Under One Absurd
Condition, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 6, 2016), https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/brett-favres-willingto-be-cowboys-backup-qb-under-one-absurd-condition/ (noting Favre “kept a straight face during
the entire interview, which means he probably seriously contemplated a return for about five
seconds.”).
16. See Gatter, supra note 11.
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field experience. The lack of even one report of such transmission in 31,000
cases over forty-two years is fabulously strong evidence that the risk of such
transmission, if not zero, so closely approaches zero as to be a non-risk in
practice. Thus, for the purposes of making and deploying law, the risk of Ebola
transmission from a cough or a sneeze—like the risk of Brett Favre ever
becoming an NFL quarterback again—should be treated as a non-risk.
Better than comparing Ebola and Favre is comparing Ebola and the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) on this point. HIV is detectable in the saliva of
those infected with HIV, 17 but a variety of factors combine to make it so unlikely
for transmission to result from direct contact with the saliva of an HIV-infected
person that saliva “is not considered a body fluid through which HIV can be
transmitted.” 18 From this, a scientist might conclude that—in theory—saliva is
a bodily fluid that could transmit HIV because it contains HIV. Yet, in practice,
public health professionals do not identify coughing or sneezing as a mode of
HIV transmission; the public does not generally worry that a person with HIV
will transmit the virus by coughing or sneezing; and the government does not
take any official action to prevent the transmission of HIV via a cough or a
sneeze. 19 Similarly, individuals and governments should not act as if Ebola can
be transmitted in any way other than through direct contact with bodily fluids
and should not act as if Ebola is like diseases communicated between humans
by any other means.
Fact #2: Ebola has “dry” and “wet” symptoms, and only the wet symptoms
threaten public health.
The “wet symptoms” are those that include a bodily fluid exiting the infected
person—bleeding, coughing up blood, vomiting, and diarrhea. 20 These bodily
fluids are contaminated with the Ebola virus, and it is direct contact with these
bodily fluids that poses a substantial risk of transmission of the disease to an
uninfected person. 21 That is why the vast majority of those infected with Ebola

17. Stephanie A. Freel et al., Characterization of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 in
Saliva and Blood Plasma by V3-Specific Heteroduplex Tracking Assay and Genotype Analyses, 75
J. VIROLOGY 4936, 4936 (2001).
18. Saliva, AIDSMAP (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.aidsmap.com/Saliva/page/1322841/.
19. See, e.g., Karen Klinka, AIDS, Virus Not Transmitted Like Common Cold, Flu Health
Officials Dispel Misconceptions About Disease, OKLAHOMAN (Nov. 12, 1991), https://newsok.com
/article/2375050/aids-virus-not-transmitted-like-common-cold-flu-health-officials-dispel-miscon
ceptions-about-disease.
20. Frequently Asked Questions On Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/faq-ebola/en/ (last updated May 2017); Gustavo E.
Velásquez et al., Time From Infection to Disease and Infectiousness for Ebola Virus Disease, A
Systematic Review, 61 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1135, 1135 (2015).
21. Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease), supra note 7.
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are individuals who either (1) cared for someone with Ebola experiencing wet
symptoms or (2) prepared someone for burial who died from Ebola. 22
Yet, Ebola also has “dry symptoms”—fever, headache, body aches, and
nausea—that, by their nature, do not involve any bodily fluids. 23 Because
human-to-human transmission of Ebola results from direct contact with infected
bodily fluids, 24 and because Ebola’s dry symptoms do not include the release of
infected bodily fluids, 25 it stands to reason that a person with Ebola who is
experiencing only dry symptoms does not pose a significant risk of transmitting
the disease to others nearby.
Ignoring the distinction between Ebola’s wet and dry symptoms leads to
confusion and fear of the wrong symptoms and the wrong people. Consider the
case of Dr. Craig Spencer. He was exposed to Ebola as a Doctors-WithoutBorders volunteer while treating Ebola patients in Guinea in 2014. 26 As a
volunteer, he wore protective equipment to treat those patients. 27 When Dr.
Spencer returned to his home in New York City in mid-October 2014, he
followed the self-monitoring guidelines for those exposed to Ebola, which were
then in use by Doctors-Without-Borders and consistent with recommendations
of the CDC. 28 The guidelines instructed him to take his temperature twice
daily, 29 and he paid attention to any feelings of nausea, headache, or malaise. 30
For several days his temperature was normal, and he felt fine. 31 When he
recorded a raised temperature on his sixth day at home, he followed the
instructions he had been given and called Doctors-Without-Borders, which in
turn contacted New York’s public health officials, who promptly placed him into
isolation at Bellevue Hospital based on his dry symptoms. 32 Only after Dr.
Spencer was in isolation in a hospital did he begin experiencing Ebola’s wet
symptoms that pose a significant risk of transmission to others. 33 He received
supportive care in isolation while his body fought the infection, and he

22. Frequently Asked Questions On Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 20.
23. Id.; Velásquez et al., supra note 20.
24. Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease), supra note 7.
25. See Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 1.
26. Sydney Lupkin, Ebola in America: Timeline of the Deadly Virus, ABCNEWS (Nov. 17,
2014), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/ebola-america-timeline/story?id=26159719.
27. Craig Spencer, Having and Fighting Ebola – Public Health Lessons from a Clinician
Turned Patient, 372 N. ENG. J. MED. 1089, 1090 (2015).
28. Sydney Lupkin, New Jersey, New York, Illinois, Toughen Ebola Quarantine Rules After
Doctor Case, ABCNEWS (Oct. 24, 2014), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/york-doctorebola-%20
quarantine/story?id=26431431.
29. Id.
30. See Spencer, supra note 27.
31. Id.
32. Lupkin, supra note 28.
33. See Spencer, supra note 27.
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survived. 34 Because Dr. Spencer only experienced dry symptoms prior to his
isolation from others, and because Ebola’s dry symptoms—fever, body aches,
headache, nausea, and malaise—do not pose a risk of transmitting the disease to
others, Dr. Spencer did not put others at risk for Ebola.
To the public at large, however, Dr. Spencer was a villain for riding the New
York subway and going out in public during the several days after he returned
home and before he was hospitalized when, unbeknownst to anyone, he was
infected with Ebola. 35 To them, Dr. Spencer’s conduct was reckless because—
as it happened—he could become symptomatic at any time and media outlets
and health officials explained that, while asymptomatic individuals cannot
spread Ebola, those experiencing symptoms can. 36 Here is what a physician said
in his role as the ABC News Chief Health and Medical Editor: “Ebola is
contagious when someone is symptomatic, [ ]. A fever is the first symptom of
Ebola, which means the virus is beginning to multiply in the patient’s blood
when a fever sets in . . . . Ebola is spread through close contact with an infected
person, and it’s not airborne.” 37 This physician made no distinction between
Ebola’s dry and wet symptoms and thus no distinction between the virtually zero
risk of transmission posed by dry symptoms and the significant risk of
transmission posed by wet symptoms. Instead, he links the risk of transmission
to being “symptomatic,” identifies “a fever as the first symptom,” and says that
transmission results from “close contact” with an “infected” person. 38 Unless a
person hearing this report knows more about Ebola, she would be left with the
erroneous impression that there is a significant risk of Ebola transmission if she
gets close to a person whose only symptom is a fever.
Missing the distinction between Ebola’s relatively benign dry symptoms and
its quite dangerous wet symptoms was huge. Not only was it the difference
between treating Dr. Spencer as a villain rather than a hero, it triggered an
unfounded and draconian change in the quarantine policies of several states. The
day after the news broke that Spencer experienced a fever and was isolated, New
Jersey, New York, and Illinois announced new policies under which
asymptomatic individuals exposed to Ebola would be quarantined. 39

34. See id.
35. Lupkin, supra note 28.
36. Odds of Catching Ebola on the Subway and Other Handy Facts, ABC NEWS (Oct. 24,
2014), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/odds-catching-ebola-subway-handy-facts/story?id=262820
17.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Lupkin, supra note 28.
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Fact #3: A fever is Ebola’s canary in a coalmine; it provides timely warning
of a coming threat.
If a person exposed to Ebola is, in fact, infected with the disease, she will
experience non-infectious, dry symptoms for several days prior to the onset of
infectious, wet symptoms. 40 Thus, the onset of dry symptoms in a person
exposed to Ebola is useful to public health officials; it signals that it is time to
isolate this person and, given the delay between the onset of dry and wet
symptoms, officials have time to move the person into isolation without
endangering others.
An experienced infectious disease specialist who treated Ebola patients in
West Africa in 2014 and 2015 wrote in the New England Journal of Medicine
about the risk of transmission that infected public health workers might present
to others. 41 He said, “[W]e now know that fever precedes the contagious stage,
allowing workers who are unknowingly infected to identify themselves before
they become a threat to their community.” 42 A systematic review lends empirical
support for this claim. The review mined published Ebola studies for case
accounts that distinguished between the onset of dry and wet symptoms, found
a dozen such accounts, and from that, surmised that dry symptoms precede wet
symptoms by an average of six days. 43 The authors also provided the following
timeline for the progression of the disease. 44

Dr. Spencer’s experience follows this timeline, and it demonstrates that
health officials relied on the dry symptoms as an indicator that it was time to
isolate him before he experienced the wet symptoms that posed a significant risk

40. Velásquez et al., supra note 20, at 1139 (reviewing available case reports that distinguish
between the onset of dry and wet symptoms and concluding that dry symptoms precede wet
symptoms by an average of six days).
41. Jeffrey M. Drazen et al., Ebola and Quarantine, 371 N. ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2029 (2014).
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Velásquez et al., supra note 20, at 1139.
44. Id. at 1138 fig.1.
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of transmission to others. We can track his story from left to right across the
timeline of Ebola’s symptoms and infectiousness, above. 45
Dr. Spencer was infected with Ebola sometime during his deployment to
West Africa. 46 Following the timeline, above, Spencer not only entered the
“incubation period” at the time of his infection, but also the “latent period” in
the sense that he was infected with Ebola but not yet infectious to others. During
the “incubation period,” he re-entered the U.S. and was out and about in his
hometown of New York City before experiencing any symptoms, dry or wet. 47
Then, several days after returning home, he developed a fever. 48 According to
the timeline, that marked the end of his “incubation period,” because he
experienced dry symptoms of Ebola. Importantly, however, Spencer remained
in the “latent period” of Ebola’s progression because—experiencing only dry
symptoms that are not a mode of transmitting the disease—Spencer was not yet
infectious to others. 49 At this stage, Spencer reported his condition to public
health authorities, who promptly isolated him in anticipation of the next stage of
his illness—the wet symptoms—that would pose a significant risk of
transmission of Ebola to others. 50 Dr. Spencer left the “latent period” and entered
the “infectious period” when he experienced the first wet symptoms, which was
after he had been isolated in a special unit in a hospital. 51
Again, the progression of Ebola in Dr. Spencer’s case—including the
several days delay between spiking a fever and experiencing the very first of the
wet symptoms—was typical. Thus, a fever or other dry symptom, when
experienced by a person who has been exposed to Ebola, is a reliable, noninfectious signal that the person will soon experience symptoms that pose a
significant risk of disease transmission to others. 52 Consequently, public
officials must acknowledge, teach, and defend that Ebola’s fever is a warning,
not a threat.

45. Id.
46. See Lisa Schnirring, Ebola Confirmed in NYC Doctor as WHO Warns About Mali, CTR.
FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. AND POL’Y (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-per
spective/2014/10/ebola-confirmed-nyc-doctor-who-warns-about-mali
(describing
Spencer’s
infection as “linked to exposure in West Africa.”).
47. See id. (noting that Spencer was screened by authorities at the airport when he re-entered
the U.S.); see also Helen Ouyang, The Doctor Who Got Ebola, N.Y. MAG. (June 7, 2015), http://ny
mag.com/intelligencer/2015/06/craig-spencer-after-ebola.html?gtm=top&gtm=bottom.
48. Ouyang, supra note 47.
49. Velásquez et al., supra note 20, at 1138 fig.1.
50. Ouyang, supra note 47.
51. Velásquez et al., supra note 20, at 1138 fig.1; Ouyang, supra note 47.
52. See Velásquez et al., supra note 20, at 1139 (reviewing available case reports that
distinguish between the onset of dry and wet symptoms and concluding that dry symptoms precede
wet symptoms by an average of six days). Drazen et al., supra note 41.
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Officials failed to do this in 2014 53 and continue this failure today. For
example, the CDC’s official explanation of Ebola transmission does not even
distinguish between Ebola’s dry and wet symptoms, let alone explain that
Ebola’s dry symptoms provide a non-infectious warning to move a person into
isolation while there is still time to do so prior to the onset of the infectious
symptoms. 54 About Ebola transmission, the CDC says: “[t]he Ebola virus
CANNOT spread to others until a person develops signs or symptoms of
[Ebola].” 55 The phrase “signs or symptoms” is then linked to a single list of all
Ebola symptoms dry and wet, fever and bleeding. 56
If the CDC—the nation’s foremost public health agency—does not explain
that a fever is the canary in Ebola’s coal mine, then we should not be surprised
when that fact goes unacknowledged by others when making critical public
health decisions. Indeed, this may explain why, at the peak of the Ebola scare,
the CDC issued guidance that invited state health officials to quarantine
asymptomatic individuals who had been exposed to Ebola. 57 It may also explain
why several states, in late October 2014, adopted policies to quarantine even
asymptomatic individuals who had recently traveled to a country where Ebola
was widespread. 58 And it might also explain why two federal district courts, well
after the scare had subsided, dismissed the lawsuits of several individuals who
returned to or visited the U.S. from affected West African nations and who were
quarantined in New Jersey and Connecticut even though they did not have even
the dry symptoms of Ebola. 59
Consider, for example, the ruling of the federal district court in Connecticut
in a lawsuit brought by a class of quarantined individuals, which included a
Liberian family that had traveled to Connecticut to visit relatives in October
2014, never experienced any symptoms of Ebola, and yet were quarantined by

53. In late October 2014, when Craig Spencer developed a fever and was isolated, the CDC’s
website said of human-to-human transmission that, “You can only get Ebola from the body fluids
of a person who is sick with or has died from Ebola . . . “ without defining what it means to be “sick
with” Ebola. Facts About Ebola in the U.S., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/infographic.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2019).
54. See Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease), supra note 7; Signs and Symptoms, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/symptoms/index.html (last reviewed
May 22, 2018).
55. Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease), supra note 7 (emphasis in original).
56. Signs and Symptoms, supra note 54.
57. See Notes on the Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with
Potential Ebola Virus Exposure, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.
gov/vhf/ebola/exposure/monitoring-and-movement-of-persons-with-exposure.html (last updated
Dec. 27, 2017); see also Gatter, supra note 11, at 377.
58. See Lupkin, supra note 28; Gatter, supra note 11, at 394.
59. Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-00201(AVC), 2017 WL 4897048,
at *3–4, *14 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017); Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 584, 586 (D.N.J.
2016).
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Connecticut officials in the basement of their relative’s home for twenty-one
days. 60 In 2016, well after the U.S. Ebola scare had ended, the class sued
Connecticut’s governor seeking damages under § 1983. 61 The federal district
court dismissed the claim, holding that state officials were protected by qualified
immunity because, according to the court, the state’s quarantine was
reasonable. 62
The court’s opinion demonstrates the irrationality that results when the
distinction between Ebola’s dry and wet symptoms is lost along with the fact
that the dry symptoms provide a reliable warning that it is time to isolate the
infected person prior to the onset of the wet symptoms that pose a significant
threat to others. To justify the state’s decision to quarantine individuals who
traveled to Connecticut from a West African nation where Ebola was
widespread, the court erroneously assumed that all of Ebola’s symptoms
threaten others and that those symptoms could arise without any warning, as
demonstrated by this passage in the court’s opinion:
While asymptomatic individuals cannot transmit Ebola, quarantining an
individual during the incubation period is not arbitrary; it is substantially related
to preventing any potential transmission of a highly infectious illness. For
instance, an asymptomatic individual could potentially become symptomatic
during the incubation period and then transmit the illness to others prior to
being isolated. 63

The court is simply wrong. Quarantining someone exposed to Ebola to protect
others from the risk of transmission posed by Ebola’s first symptoms is
quintessentially arbitrary because Ebola’s first symptoms—the dry symptoms—
do not pose a significant risk of transmission. 64 Even if the court was referring
to wet symptoms in this passage, it failed to account for the fact that dry
symptoms will precede wet symptoms and thereby warn officials that the wet
symptoms will begin several days later, 65 which is plenty of time to isolate the
exposed patient.

60. Liberian Cmty Ass’n of Conn, 2017 WL 4897048, at *5; Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 584.
61. Liberian Cmty Ass’n of Conn, 2017 WL 4897048, at *1.
62. Id. at *14.
63. Id. at *11 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
64. See supra notes 20–39 and accompanying text; Velásquez et al., supra note 20 (generally
establishing that Ebola’s dry symptoms occur during the “latent period” and prior to the “infectious
period” of the disease).
65. Velásquez et al., supra note 20, at 1139 (reviewing available case reports that distinguish
between the onset of dry and wet symptoms and concluding that dry symptoms precede wet
symptoms by an average of six days); Drazen et al., supra note 41.
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III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF LOSING THESE THREE KEY FACTS ABOUT EBOLA
TRANSMISSION
Part II identified the following three facts about Ebola transmission.
• Ebola is not easily transmitted; like HIV, it requires direct contact with
the bodily fluids of a person suffering Ebola’s wet symptoms. 66
• The dry symptoms of Ebola—a fever, for example—do not pose a risk of
transmission. 67
• Ebola’s dry symptoms occur days before the dangerous wet symptoms,
giving officials time to isolate the patient before there is a significant risk
to others. 68
Because health officials, lawyers, and judges did not sufficiently articulate
and defend these facts during the 2014 Ebola scare in the U.S., they were lost.
And the consequences were grave. According to a report by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Yale Global Health Justice Partnership, states
formally quarantined or informally coerced into self-quarantine at least 273
asymptomatic individuals whom officials suspected had been exposed to
Ebola. 69 Many were health professionals who had volunteered to fight Ebola
abroad so as to prevent its spreading farther. 70
There is evidence that government policies to order every public health
worker returning from fighting Ebola abroad into a three-week quarantine
chilled volunteerism among aid workers in 2014. Doctors-Without-Borders—
faced with the prospect of losing volunteers who could not afford the additional
time away from their homes and jobs—reduced the length of their volunteers’
deployments by three weeks to account for the prospect of quarantine. 71 Other
medical aid organizations had difficulty recruiting volunteers after these state

66. See supra notes 1–19 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 20–39 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 40–64 and accompanying text.
69. AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION & YALE GLOB. HEALTH JUSTICE P’SHIP, FEAR, POLITICS,
AND EBOLA: HOW QUARANTINES HURT THE FIGHT AGAINST EBOLA AND VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTION 29 (2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu-ebolare
port.pdf [hereinafter ACLU Report].The report notes that the actual count is likely much higher
because many quarantines took place informally and because states have been secretive about such
quarantines. Id. at 28–29.
70. See id. at 19, 25–27 (identifying that state Ebola quarantine policies were specifically
aimed at returning health care workers and describing the experiences of three physicians in
particular).
71. Jonathan Allen, U.S. Quarantines ‘Chilling’ Ebola Fight in West Africa: MSF, REUTERS
(Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-ebola-usa-msf/u-s-quarantines-chillingebola-fight-in-west-africa-msf-idUSKBN0IJ2PR20141031; see also ACLU Report, supra note 69,
at 31.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2018]

THREE LOST EBOLA FACTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH LEGAL PREPAREDNESS

203

policies were announced in October 2014, with one experiencing a twenty-five
percent reduction in its volunteer work force. 72
When volunteerism dropped in early November 2014, Ebola in three West
African nations posed a tremendous global threat. The WHO declared a
worldwide public health emergency only three months before in August. 73 The
first of the three affected West African countries would not be declared Ebolafree until May 2015, 74 and it would be another thirteen months before WHO
would declare the emergency over. 75 When volunteerism first dropped, there
had been 13,241 Ebola infections and 4,950 deaths to that point in the epidemic,
but these numbers would more than double before the epidemic’s end,
ballooning to 28,616 confirmed infections and 11,310 deaths. 76 We will never
know how many of these infections and deaths would have been prevented had
state quarantine policies not diminished the volunteer public health workforce.
In short, the moment when several states announced that they would
quarantine everyone traveling to the U.S. from Liberia, Guinea, or Sierra Leone
with or without symptoms of Ebola was the worst time to do so. When the U.S.
is threatened by a growing epidemic in another part of the world, our policy
should be to encourage greater volunteerism among public health and medical
professionals. Like fighting a fire, the strategy for fighting the spread of a
dangerous infectious disease is to mount a global response where the disease
flares so as to contain it and prevent its spreading. 77 Announcing a policy of
post-deployment quarantine for all returning people who volunteer to fight a
large Ebola flare-up abroad will diminish the workforce available to contain the
disease, which in turn, will give the epidemic a better opportunity to turn into a
pandemic.
Losing these key facts about Ebola transmission also opened the door to the
most invidious forms of discrimination. 78 For example, Nigerian students who
applied to a community college in Texas were rejected in letters stating that the
college was “not accepting international students from countries with confirmed

72. ACLU Report, supra note 69, at 31.
73. Statement On the 1st meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee On the 2014 Ebola
Outbreak in West Africa, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 8, 2014), https://www.who.int/mediacentre/
news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/.
74. The Ebola Outbreak in Liberia is Over, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 9, 2015),
https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/liberia-ends-ebola/en/.
75. Situation Report: Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 10, 2016),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/208883/ebolasitrep_10Jun2016_eng.pdf?se
quence=1.
76. Case Counts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/
ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/case-counts.html (last reviewed Mar. 8, 2019).
77. See ACLU Report, supra note 69, at 10.
78. Gatter, supra note 11, at 398; see ACLU Report, supra note 69, at 29–30.
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Ebola cases.” 79 This happened despite the fact that there had been at least one
confirmed case of Ebola in the U.S. at the time the college wrote its rejection
letters. 80 In another example, Senegalese-American children in New York City
were beaten and taunted by their school classmates, who yelled “Ebola!” while
hitting them. 81 In still other instances, the spouses and children of health
professionals and government officials who traveled to West Africa were not
permitted to go to work or attend school for fear that they had caught Ebola at
home and could spread it in school or at work. 82
The irrational actions officials took and that courts failed to remedy when
these three facts were lost may have signaled erroneously to the rest of society
that someone exposed to Ebola, potentially exposed to Ebola, or who lives with
someone who may have been exposed to Ebola poses a real threat to everyone.
When the law permits irrational actions that contravene the scientific facts of
Ebola transmission, it should not surprise us that schools, employers, coworkers, business owners, and neighbors follow the law’s lead.
Finally, a consequence of losing these key facts about Ebola transmission is
bad legal precedent and erosion of what constitutes reasonable action by public
health agencies. As referenced in Part II, two federal lawsuits were filed after
the 2014 Ebola scare that sought compensation for the unjustified quarantine of
a nurse in New Jersey and a family from Liberia that was visiting Connecticut
on a visa. 83 Each case was brought under § 1983 against a state governor and
state public health officials. 84 In each case, the defendants filed motions to
dismiss based on qualified immunity, and each federal court granted those
motions. 85 In so doing, the federal district courts in New Jersey and Connecticut
ruled on the basis of just a few federal opinions addressing the constitutionality
of quarantine, none of which involved Ebola. 86 From those cases, the federal
district courts in New Jersey and Connecticut concluded that public health
officials need only act reasonably and that it is reasonable to quarantine a person
79. Texas College Rejects Nigerian Applicants, Cites Ebola Cases, NBC NEWS (Oct. 15,
2014), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/texas-college-rejects-nigerian-ap
plicants-cites-ebola-cases-n226291.
80. See id.
81. Elizabeth Barber, 2 Kids from Senegal Were Beaten Up in NYC by Classmates Yelling
‘Ebola’, TIME (Oct. 27, 2014), http://time.com/3542955/senegalkids-brothers-assaulted-ebolabronx -tremont-school-new-york-city-pabe-amadou-drame/.
82. Anemona Hartocollis & Nate Schweber, Bellevue Employees Face Ebola at Work, and
Stigma of It Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/ny
region/bellevue-workers-worn-out-from-treating-ebola-patient-face-stigma-outside-hospital.html.
83. Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 584 (D.N.J. 2016); Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn.
v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-00201(AVC), 2017 WL 4897048, at *1, *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017).
84. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 584; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *1.
85. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 584; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *1.
86. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 590–92; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at
*10.
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exposed to a dangerous infectious disease for the duration of the disease’s
incubation period. 87 Because each of the two lawsuits concerned individuals
who were exposed or at least potentially exposed to Ebola and quarantine orders
that limited quarantine to Ebola’s incubation period, the courts concluded the
defendant-officials had acted reasonably and were immune from suit for
compensation. 88
Even assuming that the courts adopted the right standard, their application
of it stripped the “reason” right out of “reasonableness.” Each court was content
to treat all infectious diseases as similarly dangerous without taking account for
the different ways diseases are transmitted from person to person. 89 Neither
court accounted for the modes of Ebola transmission. 90 As a result, neither court
could possibly determine what governmental actions are or are not based on
reason. And now these two opinions are themselves precedent for future courts
and cases. In this way, a consequence of Ebola’s lost facts is that
“reasonableness” is less likely to be treated as a meaningful check on public
health action in the face of an infectious disease.
IV. HOW DID THE KEY FACTS ABOUT EBOLA TRANSMISSION GET LOST?
As explored next, the 2014 Ebola scare and its legal aftermath demonstrate
that we were not prepared to deploy the law effectively in the face of public fear.
This part examines evidence that lawyers and judges were not prepared to deploy
the law quickly so as to more effectively protect those injured by unnecessary
quarantine, to discipline state officials who violate the law while attempting to
protect the public’s health, or to establish valuable precedent.
While public fear of an ongoing outbreak likely caused officials in 2014 to
ignore the facts of Ebola transmission when adopting and enforcing policies to
quarantine individuals returning from countries where Ebola was widespread, 91
such fear could not have been at play when two federal courts—years after the
scare had ended—addressed two lawsuits brought by those who had been
quarantined. 92 Rather, the failure of these courts to account for these facts must

87. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 593; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *12.
88. See Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 593; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at
*9.
89. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 590–92 (relying on case law involving smallpox and a venereal
disease); Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *10 (analogizing to case law
involving smallpox).
90. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 590–92; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at
*10.
91. Wendy E. Parmet & Michael S. Sinha, A Panic Foretold: Ebola in the United States, 27
CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 148, 152 (2017); Gatter, supra note 11; ACLU Report, supra note 68, at
25–27.
92. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 584; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *1.
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have resulted from other factors, including the strategies used by the lawyers
representing the plaintiffs. 93
Lawyers for individuals unjustifiably quarantined in Connecticut and New
Jersey during the 2014 Ebola scare sued state officials in those states seeking
compensation under § 1983 for federal constitutional violations. 94 Claims for
civil damages under § 1983 are subject to the defense of qualified immunity. 95
Predictably, the officials from Connecticut and New Jersey who were named as
defendants in those two lawsuits filed motions to dismiss based on their claimed
qualified immunity. 96 “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government
officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’” 97 For a time, the Supreme Court of the United States
required that a court addressing the defense of qualified immunity must
determine first whether the official had violated a right of the plaintiff’s that was
guaranteed by federal law; if so, then a court must determine also whether the
violated statutory or constitutional right was clearly established and whether it
was a right about which a reasonable person would have known at the time the
official violated it. 98 More recently, however, the Supreme Court receded from
this position, ruling instead that a reviewing court, at its discretion, may make
these two determinations in either order. 99
Thus, by suing for money damages under § 1983, lawyers for the individuals
formerly quarantined by the States of Connecticut and New Jersey subjected
their clients to two related risks. First is the general risk that the defendants
would escape liability based on a qualified immunity defense. Second is the risk
that the reviewing courts, rather than judge whether the defendants violated the
constitutional rights of their clients, would address whether any constitutional
right the defendants may have violated was “clearly established” and was a right
about which a “reasonable person would know” at the time of the alleged
violation.
This second risk was particularly relevant to lawsuits alleging that
quarantines in 2014 were unconstitutional, because the controlling legal
93. This Article is critical of the strategies adopted by the lawyers representing the plaintiffs
in Hickox v Christie and Liberian Community Association of Connecticut v. Malloy based on the
public policy of legal standards and practices that force health officials and courts to account for
the various modes of transmission of different infectious diseases. This article does not question
that the lawyers representing the quarantined plaintiffs served their clients loyally, professionally,
and in ways that met the relevant standard of care.
94. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 584; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *1.
95. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009).
96. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 584, 593; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048,
at *1.
97. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818(1982)).
98. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001).
99. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
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standard was uncertain. Very few published federal court opinions existed then
(and now) addressing the constitutionality of quarantine orders. 100 With so few
data points from which to construct a bright-line rule about how broad
constitutional principles apply to quarantine, a court is more easily justified in
reaching the conclusion that any constitutional right is under developed or
ambiguous and thus neither “clearly established” nor a right that a “reasonable
person would have known.” 101 Moreover, courts must account for the 1905
Supreme Court holding in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 102 and they have taken
different positions on whether state quarantine orders are assessed under modern
substantive due process jurisprudence or whether they are subject to a
“reasonableness” standard unique to public health actions. 103 A court can take
these differing positions as additional evidence that the right to be free of
quarantine is somewhat unsettled and thus neither “clearly established” nor
something about which a “reasonable person would have known.” 104
Other options existed during and after the U.S. Ebola scare for challenging
the legality of Connecticut’s and New Jersey’s quarantine of asymptomatic
individuals, including suing for damages under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 105
and seeking judicial review under administrative law of the quarantine while it
was ongoing. 106 These would have triggered more rigorous legal standards than
those available under the federal constitution, which would reduce the likelihood
that the key facts of Ebola transmission would get lost.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits disability
discrimination. 107 It provides: “No otherwise qualified individual with a
disability . . . shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, . . . be subjected to
discrimination . . . under any program or activity conducted by any Executive

100. Indeed, the Hickox and Liberian Cmty. Ass’n Courts’ opinions each describe those handful
of cases and thereby exhaust the federal case law on point. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 590–92;
Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *10.
101. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (explaining the requirements for the qualified immunity
defense).
102. Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 27–28 (1905) (upholding the requirement that individuals
be vaccinated against smallpox on the grounds that it is reasonable action by public health
authorities).
103. Scott Burris, Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34 VILL. L. R. 933,
960–70 (1989) (examining the different interpretations that courts and commentators have given to
the Supreme Court’s application of the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
federal Constitution in 1905 opinion Jacobson v. Massachusetts, because the opinion pre-dates the
development of modern substantive due process jurisprudence).
104. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (explaining the requirements for the qualified immunity
defense).
105. See infra notes 106–113 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 114–116 and accompanying text.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012).
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agency . . .” which is defined to include all state administrative agencies. 108
Additionally, it has been deemed to create a private right of action for damages
for those who are victims of intentional discrimination. 109 Most notably, the
Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline held that § 504
applies to actions taken against individuals who have or who are perceived to
have a contagious disease. 110 In such cases, courts must include findings of fact:
based on reasonable medical judgments given the state of medical knowledge,
about (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration
of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what
is the potential harm to third parties), and (d) the probabilities the disease will
be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm. 111

The Court’s specificity in describing the findings that a court must make
when ruling on whether a state agency discriminates against a person perceived
to have a contagious disease could have helped assure that a court accounts for
the facts about Ebola’s mode of transmission and the relationship between
Ebola’s infectious period and its wet and dry symptoms. Lawyers for the New
Jersey plaintiff did not include a claim based on § 504 in their complaint. 112
While the complaint in the suit challenging Connecticut’s quarantine of
asymptomatic individuals included a claim for disability discrimination under §
504, 113 the claim was pled incorrectly and dismissed despite efforts of the

108. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), (b)(1)(A).
109. “The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
. . . shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal
assistance or Federal provider of such assistant under section 794 of this title.” 29 U.S.C. §
794a(a)(2). The public health agencies of both Connecticut and New Jersey are recipients of federal
assistance. ASS’N OF ST. & TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS, ASTHO PROFILE OF STATE AND
TERRITORIAL PUBLIC HEALTH 132, 162 (2017), http://www.astho.org/Profile/Volume-Four/2016ASTHO-Profile-of-State-and-Territorial-Public-Health/. Additionally, U.S. Department of Justice
guidance states that monetary damages are available to individuals who are victims of intentional
discrimination under Title VI. Section IX- Private Right of Action & Individual Relief Through
Agency Action, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/T6Manual9 (last updated Jan. 26,
2017). Thus, individuals in Connecticut or New Jersey ordered into quarantine in a manner that
violates the Rehabilitation Act’s prohibition against disability discrimination may sue for monetary
damages so long as they claim the disability discrimination was intentional.
110. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282, 289 (1987) (§ 504 applies to a public
school board’s firing of a teacher with remitting and relapsing tuberculosis because a person with
a contagious disease is “handicapped” under the statute; the case was remanded to district court for
findings of fact relevant to whether the teacher was “otherwise qualified” to teach in the classroom).
111. Id. at 288 (emphasis added). The Court went on to say, “In making these findings, courts
normally should defer to the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials.” Id.
112. Verified Complaint at 28–33, Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 578 (D.N.J. 2016) (No.
15-7647).
113. Trial Pleading at 43–45, Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv00201(AVC), 2017 WL 4897048 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017).
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plaintiffs’ lawyers to amend the complaint belatedly through its brief on the
defendants’ motion to dismiss. 114
In some instances, lawyers representing asymptomatic individuals subject
to a quarantine order might also take advantage of a so-called “hard look”
standard for judicial review of agency actions. Under the federal Administrative
Procedures Act, a court may set aside an agency action—including a quarantine
order—if the action is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. 115 When
applied to a federal agency’s discretionary actions, this standard of review is
relatively rigorous. While a court may not substitute its own judgment for that
of the agency, the court must take a hard look at the logic used by the agency
and assure that it is rational. 116 The hard look is intended to be a “thorough,
probing, in-depth review” of the agency’s decision, which requires the reviewing
court to assure that the agency rationally addressed every relevant factor and did
not make a clear error of judgment in reaching its conclusion. 117 Where a hardlook standard of review is available, a lawyer could use it to challenge a public
health agency’s judgment that an asymptomatic individual exposed to Ebola
poses a significant risk of communicating the disease to others. In particular,
those individuals could argue that, in order to account for every relevant factor
in an in-depth and probing manner, a court must assess whether the agency
considered each of the key facts about Ebola transmission when reaching its
judgment.
Of course, the quarantine orders at issue in the Connecticut and New Jersey
cases were issued by state—not federal—agencies. 118 Consequently, lawyers for
the quarantined individuals would have needed to identify the relevant state law
analog to the federal hard-look review. 119 A challenge of the New Jersey
quarantine order based on such a standard of review may have been available,
because the state Supreme Court has recognized judicial authority to set aside
agency actions where “the agency clearly erred by reaching a conclusion that
could not reasonably have been made upon a showing of the relevant factors.” 120
Yet, there is significant variation among states as to the rigor applied by courts

114. Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *11 n.23.
115. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
116. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415–16 (1971). This test
is informally known as the “hard look” standard of review. MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M.
LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 592 (3d ed. 2009).
117. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415–16.
118. Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 578, 586–87 (D.N.J. 2016); Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of
Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *4–5.
119. Hard look review might be available in Connecticut. Envirotest Sys. Corp. v. Freedom of
Info. Comm’n, 757 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Conn. App. 2000) (explaining discretionary judgments of
administrative agencies are given considerable weight by courts).
120. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 501 A.2d 125, 129 (N.J.
1985).
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reviewing discretionary state agency actions. 121 Some state standards of review
are quite deferential, while others have come closer to mimicking the federal
hard-look probe. 122
Regardless of the claims used to challenge quarantines like those in
Connecticut and New Jersey, lawyers are more likely to force courts to account
for the key facts about Ebola transmission if they feature those facts in their
complaints and briefs. A review of the pleadings in the Connecticut and New
Jersey cases reveal that they were largely silent on the unique progression of
Ebola that explained why quarantine was irrational unless and until an exposed
individual developed a fever. 123
Ten pleadings, including eight briefs, were submitted to district or appellate
courts in the Connecticut and New Jersey cases arguing that each state’s
quarantine of asymptomatic individuals during the Ebola scare was
inappropriate and illegal. 124 Of those ten pleadings only one included all of the
key facts about Ebola transmission. 125 Even that one brief did not address the
several days of lag time between dry and wet symptoms, and it did not feature
the key transmission facts by addressing them early in the brief, identifying all
three facts in a single sentence starting at the bottom of page fifteen of that
brief. 126 Nor did this brief highlight the facts in an easy-to-understand, hard-toignore context, such as comparing Ebola transmission to HIV transmission or
including graphs or images that encapsulate or depict the facts. Rather, the brief
states simply that “[a]symptomatic individuals cannot transmit the disease to

121. ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 116, at 598, 599.
122. Id.
123. See generally Verified Complaint, Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 578 (D.N.J. 2016)
(No. 15-7647); Trial Pleading, Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv00201(AVC), 2017 WL 4897048 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017).
124. The relevant pleadings for Hickox v Christie in the federal district court for the District of
New Jersey include the plaintiff’s complaint and her brief in opposition to the defendants’ motion
to dismiss. The pleadings for Liberian Community Association of Connecticut v. Malloy include
the plaintiffs’ complaint and brief in opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss filed in the
federal district court for the District of Connecticut as well as the plaintiffs’ opening and reply
appellate briefs and four amicus briefs filed in the federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The following three questions were addressed in the review of each of the briefs: (1) Does the brief
state that Ebola is not transmitted by asymptomatic individuals? (2) Does the brief state that Ebola
is not transmitted by individuals infected with Ebola who have dry symptoms such as fever? (3)
Does the brief state that there is a lag time of several days between the onset of dry symptoms and
wet symptoms?
125. Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on Behalf
of Plaintiff, Kaci Hickox at 15–16, Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 578 (D.N.J. 2016) (No. 157647).
126. Id.
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others, and, critically, fever precedes the contagious stage.” 127 Of the remaining
seven briefs, only one other—an amicus brief—includes two of the key facts. 128
Advocates for rational quarantine increase the likelihood that the law will
lose the key facts of Ebola transmission when those advocates fail to at least
mention all of those facts in each of their pleadings. Of course, good advocacy
may call for not only mentioning, but also highlighting these foundational facts.
One sentence located fifteen pages into a brief is more easily missed by a judge
than a sentence featured at the start of the brief and in brief headings. Indeed,
this very Article begins with the three lost facts and uses an image to depict one
of them. The reader should ask herself whether those facts are hard to ignore
when featured in that way.
To this point, the Article has examined ways that lawyers can help assure
that courts do not lose sight of the key facts of Ebola transmission when
reviewing a legal challenge to the quarantine of asymptomatic individuals. Yet,
courts also bear responsibility to assure that those facts are discovered and
accounted for. That responsibility is inherent in even the most deferential
standard of judicial review. 129 A court asked to address whether a public health
agency has acted reasonably and without abusing its discretion need not simply
defer to the expertise of the agency without requiring that the agency to identify
and explain the logic the agency deployed to reach its conclusion that quarantine
was appropriate. Additionally, a court is not failing to act with appropriate
deference to the agency if the court requires the agency to explain how its
determination about the risk posed by asymptomatic individuals exposed to
Ebola is consistent with the best available medical and public health evidence
about how the disease is transmitted from human-to-human. A court that does
not make such a minimal inquiry is failing to assure that quarantine orders are
“reasonable” whether or not lawyers for those quarantined adequately argue for
such an inquiry. 130
In fact, a state trial court in Maine undertook such a minimal and nonetheless
rigorous review when the State sought a temporary order to quarantine Kaci
Hickox, a nurse and public health worker who returned to her home in Maine
127. Id.
128. Brief for Amici Curiae Mark Barnes and Leana Wen in Support of Appellants at 5–6,
Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-00201(AVC), 2017 WL 4897048 (D. Conn.
Mar. 30, 2017) (“As CDC and medical experts had publicly stated, asymptomatic individuals
cannot spread the Ebola virus, while fever precedes the stage at which Ebola is contagious, such
that an individual can be isolated well before becoming a threat to others.”) (footnotes omitted).
129. See supra notes 106–116 and accompanying text.
130. Several jurisdictions are aided by bench books designed to guide courts through legal
decision-making related to public health. Public Health Law Bench Books, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/phlp/publications/topic/benchbooks.html (last
reviewed Oct. 31, 2018). A valuable future research question is whether those bench books instruct
courts in cases challenging quarantine and isolation orders to make findings with respect to the
modes of transmission for the particular infectious diseases at issue.
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after returning to the U.S. from treating Ebola patients in West Africa in 2014. 131
The record contained only the state’s petition, which identified Ms. Hickox as
one who was exposed to but was asymptomatic for Ebola. 132 Nonetheless, the
court, in carrying out its statutory duty to review the necessity of the order
requested in the petition, identified a fundamental flaw in the state’s logic;
namely, that the petition sought to quarantine Hickox while also admitting that
Hickox was asymptomatic and that only those experiencing symptoms of Ebola
can transmit the disease to others. 133 As a result—and without any advocate
arguing on behalf of Ms. Hickox—the court denied the petition to the extent that
it sought an immediate quarantine. 134 If a state trial court in Maine can carry out
such an inquiry during a claimed emergency, including hearing from only one
party in the dispute, then certainly two federal district courts should have been
able to make a similar inquiry more than a year after the Ebola scare had ended—
regardless of any information provided or arguments made by advocates for the
quarantined individuals.
V. CONCLUSION: RE-EXAMINING PUBLIC HEALTH LEGAL PREPAREDNESS?
The preceding parts demonstrate that lawyers and judges are not sufficiently
prepared to deploy the law effectively even after a public health emergency, let
alone during one. As a remedy, public health organizations, policy makers, and
professional organizations for lawyers and judges, among others, must prioritize
greater preparedness for public health crises. Specific steps should include:
• identifying and training a corps of lawyers in all fifty states who agree, on
an emergency basis, to represent individuals subject to state public health
orders during a disease epidemic or other population health scare;
• develop a legal go-team, perhaps through the CDC, that would support
state and local public health officials during a public health scare;
• publish guides for lawyers identifying and comparing various claims that
could be relevant in the representation of persons subject to public health
orders during an emergency; and
• offer table-top public health exercises for judges and lawyers.
These strategies, at least in theory, fit under the concept of public health
legal preparedness. As a practical matter, however, doing so will require a
reconsideration of the concept.

131. Gatter, supra note 11, at 376.
132. Verified Petition for Public Health Order at 2, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. CV-2014-36 (Me.
Dist. Ct., Fort Kent, Oct. 30, 2014).
133. Order Pending Hearing, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. CV-2014-36 (Me. Dist. Ct., Fort Kent,
Oct. 31, 2014).
134. See id.
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Public health legal preparedness is defined as “legal benchmarks essential
to the preparedness of the public health system” to respond effectively to an
emergency. 135 These legal benchmarks and standards fall into four categories:
“laws and legal authorities,” 136 “competency in using laws effectively and
wisely,” 137 “coordination of legally based interventions across jurisdictions and
sectors,” and “information on public health laws and best practices.” 138 The
concept emerged after September 11, 2001, and its practical focus has been on
assuring that the legal authority of public health agencies is clear and that
officials are trained on that authority in anticipation of a public health
emergency.
The traditional focus on preparing public health officials for the legal
challenges of responding to a public health emergency is necessary but
insufficient. It is time to expand public health legal preparedness to prepare the
lawyers and judges who must make important legal and factual judgments
effectively and quickly during an emergency. This must include preparing them
to deploy law in the context of fear and even panic.

135. Anthony D. Moulton et al., What Is Public Health Legal Preparedness?, 31 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 672, 674 (2003).
136. Described as the “statutes, regulations, ordinances, court rulings, and other authoritative
statements by government bodies” that “are foundational to public health legal preparedness.”
Georges C. Benjamin & Anthony D. Moulton, Public Health Legal Preparedness: A Framework
for Action, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 13, 14 (2008).
137. This component of public health legal preparedness demands that “[p]ublic health
professionals . . . know the legal powers they have and how best to apply them.” Id. Additionally,
it requires that “emergency responders, law enforcement officials, judges, hospital managers, and
many others knowing the legal authorities held by public health officials as well as their own
relevant legal powers and imitations.” Id.
138. “Information resources . . . include, for example, practitioner guides to the established
public health laws of a given jurisdiction, updates on relevant new laws and court rulings, and
science- or experience-based best practices in using laws to support public health interventions.”
Id.
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